Employment and Unemployment E f f e c t s of Unions

I . I n t r o d u c t i o n
There i s a l a r g e body of e m p i r i c a l l i t e r a t u r e t h a t suggests t h a t u n i o n s can and do r a i s e t h e r e l a t i v e wages of t h e i r members.' I n a d d i t i o n , u n i o n s have been f o u n d t o a f f e c t t h e wages of non-union members.
a l t h o u g h t h e d i r e c t i o n and magnitude of t h i s e f f e c t i s somewhat more ambiguous. D e s p i t e an e x t e n s i v e l i t e r a t u r e t h a t examines t h e e f f e c t of u n i o n s on wages, l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n has been p a i d t o the r e s u l t a n t employment consequences o f t h i s change i n t h e r e l a t i v e c o s t o f u n i o n i z e d l a b o r . The purpose o f t h i s s t u d y i s t o examine t h e e f f e c t o f unions on t h e aggegate l e v e l o f employment i n t h e economy. I n s e c t i o n I 1 of t h i s paper, p r e v i o u s e f f o r t s t o examine t h i s L t q u e s t i o n a r e d i s c u s s e d , w h i l e i n s e c t i o n 111, a t h e o r e t i c a l model o f t h e j e f f e c t o f u n i o n s on employment and unemployment i s developed and a n a l y z e d . I n s e c t i o n I V , t h i s framework i s used t o d e r i v e and e s t i m a t e employment and l a b o r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n e q u a t i o n s . The e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s d i f f e r s f r o m p r e v i o u s e f f o r t s , i n p a r t . because i t e x p l i c i t l y c a p t u r e s t h e e f f e c t o f b o t h t h e p r o p o r t i o n u n i o n i z e d and t h e s i z e o f t h e u n i o n wage premium on v a r i o u s measures o f employment. I n p a r t i c u l a r , these r e g r e s s i o n s p r o v i d e e s t i m a t e s o f t h e e f f e c t o f d i f f e r e n c e s i n u n i o n s t r e n g t h across standard m e t r o p o l i t a n s t a t i s t i c a l a r e a (SMSAs) on t h e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l w i l l be employed, i n t h e l a b o r f o r c e , or unemployed. By examining t h e e f f e c t o f u n i o n s on t h e s i z e o f t h e l a b o r f o r c e and on t h e t o t a l number o f employed, t h i s study a l s o d i f f e r s from much of t h e p r e v i o u s work t h a t has c o n c e n t r a t e d s o l e l y on t h e e f f e c t of unions on t h e r e l a t i v e number of u n i o n and non-union
workers. F i n a l l y , by examining whether d i f f e r e n c e s i n the e x t e n t o f u n i o n power across l a b o r markets a l t e r the m i x o f p a r t -t i m e and f u l l -t i m e j o b s . t h i s study can a l s o analyze the e f f e c t o f u n i o n i s m on the workweek.
An a n a l y s i s o f t h e employment e f f e c t s o f unionism can p l a y a r o l e i n assessing t h e w e l f a r e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f changes i n t h e e x t e n t o f u n i o n i z a t i o n i n the economy. The p o t e n t i a l l y d e l e t e r i o u s e f f e c t of unions on employment i s a l s o o f importance t o those i n t e r e s t e d i n r e g i o n a l unemployment d i f f e r e n c e s . A r e c e n t s t u d y by Murphy (1985) 
found t h a t d i f f e r e n c e s i n the s e n s i t i v i t y t o ! demand c o n d i t i o n s i n the product market and wage d i f f e r e n t i a l s a r e v i t a l i n 1 d e t e r m i n i n g r e g i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n unemployment r a t e s . Since u n i o n s have been found t o a f f e c t b o t h of these v a r i a b l e s . d i f f e r e n c e s i n the e x t e n t o r
impact o f u n i o n i s m may be i m p o r t a n t i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e g i o n a l unemployment r a t e d i f f e r e n t i a l s . I n f a c t , Freeman and Medoff (1984) have p r e s e n t e d evidence t h a t suggests t h a t unemployment r a t e s a r e 1.0 p e r c e n t h i g h e r i n areas w i t h a high degree o f u n i o n i s m r e l a t i v e t o low unionism areas. However, s i n c e t h e y a l s o f a i l t o f i n d any c o r r e l a t i o n between t h e degree o f unionism and t h e employment r a t e , a f u r t h e r . more e x p l i c i t a n a l y s i s o f t h i s q u e s t i o n seems t o be necessary t o determine what e f f e c t , i f any, unions have on a g g r e g a t e
and r e g i o n a l employment r a t e s .
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P r e v i o u s L i t e r a t u r e D e s p i t e t h e r a t h e r e x t e n s i v e a t t e n t i o n p a i d t o the e f f e c t o f u n i o n s on
r e l a t i v e wages, t h e r e has been s c a n t a t t e n t i o n p a i d t o t h e a t t e n d a n t employment consequences.'
Most o f t h e s t u d i e s done on t h e employment e f f e c t s o f u n i o n s have been on t h e i n d u s t r y l e v e l . ' I n d u s t r y o r f i r m s t u d i e s , however. may o v e r e s t i m a t e t h e disemployment e f f e c t of u n i o n s , because they i g n o r e t h e f a c t t h a t some o r a l l o f t h e d i s p l a c e d workers may become employed a g a i n i n o t h e r i n d u s t r i e s o r f i r m s . Consequently, these s t u d i e s cannot p r o v i d e e s t i m a t e s o f t h e n e t o r a g g r e g a t e employment e f f e c t o f u n i o n s .
Lewis (1963 and 1964) 
p r o v i d e d t h e f i r s t a n a l y s i s of t h e r e l a t i v e wage and)
employment e f f e c t s o f unions on an aggregate b a s i s . I n these papers, Lewis d i v i d e s t h e economy i n t o a u n i o n and a non-union s e c t o r . I n d u s t r i e s w i t h a r e l a t i v e l y h i g h degree o f unionism, l i k e m a n u f a c t u r i n g and m i n i n g , were grouped i n t o t h e u n i o n i z e d s e c t o r . w h i l e t h o s e w i t h a low degree o f u n i o n i s m were grouped i n t o a non-union s e c t o r . " U s i n g t i m e s e r i e s d a t a , he e s t i m a t e s whether changes i n r e l a t i v e employment l e v e l s a c r o s s these two s e c t o r s can be a t t r i b u t e d t o d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e average u n i o n l n o n -u n i o n wages premium and t h e average p e r c e n t u n i o n i z e d . H i s r e s u l t s suggest t h a t unions 2. There have been s t u d i e s of t h e r e l a t i v e wage e f f e c t o f unions a c r o s s i n d u s t r i e s , o c c u p a t i o n s , and r a c e and gender groups.
3. See Lewis (1963) f o r a r e v i e w o f some of these i n d u s t r y s t u d i e s .
.
The u n i o n s e c t o r was made up of m i n i n g , c o n s t r u c t i o n , m a n u f a c t u r i n g , have a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a t i v e e f f e c t on r e l a t i v e employment l e v e l s and manhours worked.
Pencavel and Hartsog (1984) r e c e n t l y updated and extended t h i s seminal work. However, t h e y f a i l e d t o f i n d any c o n s i s t e n t l y n e g a t i v e impact o f unionism on manhours. I n f a c t , t h e y conclude t h a t t h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t u n i o n i s m depresses manhours can be accepted o n l y f o r t h e l a t e 1920s and e a r l y 1930s. This b a s i c r e s u l t i s n o t s e n s i t i v e t o whether t h e employment and wage e f f e c t s o f unions a r e e s t i m a t e d w i t h L e w i s ' s reduced form model o r w i t h a s t r u c t u r a l model t h a t t h e y developed.'' ! The a m b i g u i t y of these r e s u l t s may be due aggregate d a t a n o t b e i n g L I w e l l -s u i t e d t o t e s t i n g the employment e f f e c t s o f unionism.' A g g r e g a t i n g i n d u s t r i e s i n t o two s e c t o r s , as was done i n these s t u d i e s , i g n o r e s t h e e f f e c t s o f unions w i t h i n these s e c t o r s , and thus may n o t y i e l d good e s t i m a t e s of t h e o v e r a l l e f f e c t of unions on employment and wages. F u r t h e r , t h e absence o f c o n t r o l s f o r changes i n l a b o r q u a l i t y across s e c t o r s means t h a t these s t u d i e s might o v e r e s t i m a t e t h e impact o f u n i o n s on wages and underestimate t h e e f f e c t s on employment. That i s , i f f i r m s respond t o t h e u n i o n wage demands 5. The s t r u c t u r a l model o f t h e l a b o r market t h a t i s used by Pencavel and H a r t s o g was developed t o t e s t f o r t h e wage and employment e f f e c t s o f unions w i t h o u t assuming t h a t employment i s u n i l a t e r a l l y s e t by employers, o r t h a t the u n i o n wage premium i s exogenous. I t should a l s o be n o t e d t h a t t h e i r model a l s o d i f f e r s from t h a t e s t i m a t e d by Lewis (1964) . They use o n l y t h e p e r c e n t o r g a n i z e d v a r i a b l e to c a p t u r e t h e e f f e c t o f unionism and n o t t h e e s t i m a t e d u n i o n wage premium.
by s u b s t i t u t i n g f o r h i g h e r q u a l i t y l a b o r then " q u a l i t y a d j u s t e d " wages w i l l n o t r i s e as much as measured wages." Since f i r m s m i g h t reduce t h e i r demand f o r u n s k i l l e d workers r e l a t i v e t o s k i l l e d workers, t h e e f f e c t on t o t a l demand may d i f f e r f r o m t h a t on a p a r t i c u l a r t y p e o f l a b o r . ' Kahn (1978) , Kahn and Morimune (19791, and H o l z e r (1982) p r o v i d e c r o s s -s e c t i o n e s t i m a t e s o f t h e e f f e c t s of v a r i a t i o n s i n the e x t e n t o f u n i o n membership across SMSAs on employment, hours worked, and unemployment s t a b i l i t y . These c r o s s -s e c t i o n s t u d i e s use t h e f r a c t i o n o f employed workers i n an SMSA who a r e u n i o n members as t h e i r measure of u n i o n s t r e n g t h , because i t i s f e l t t h a t u n i o n i s m w i l l a f f e c t a l l workers i n t h e same l a b o r market and I L n o t j u s t those i n t h e same i n d u s t r y . That i s , workers who may be d i s p l a c e d 1 because o f u n i o n wage demands a r e l i k e l y t o seek employment n o t j u s t i n t h a t i n d u s t r y , b u t t h r o u g h o u t t h e l o c a l l a b o r m a r k e t . By u s i n g d e t a i l e d c r o s s -s e c t i o n d a t a e i t h e r from t h e C u r r e n t P o p u l a t i o n Survey (CPS) o r t h e Survey o f Economic O p p o r t u n i t y ( S E O ) , these s t u d i e s a r e b e t t e r a b l e t o c o n t r o l f o r i n d i v i d u a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and l a b o r market v a r i a b l e s t h a t a f f e c t employment. These c r o s s -s e c t i o n s t u d i e s seem p r e f e r a b l e t o the aggregate t i m e s e r i e s analyses, because t h e y a v o i d some of t h e a g g r e g a t i o n problems t h a t emerge i n t h e t i m e s e r i e s s t u d i e s . However, l i k e t h e t i m e s e r i e s s t u d i e s mentioned above, t h e c r o s s -s e c t i o n s t u d i e s do n o t address the i s s u e o f 6. The p o t e n t i a l i m p o r t a n c e of these b i a s e s can be seen by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e e s t i m a t e s o f t h e q u a l i t y -a d j u s t e d u n i o n r e l a t i v e wage e f f e c t I n t h i s s e c t i o n , we d i s c u s s t h e e f f e c t of u n i o n s on t h e number of workers who a r e employed, unemployed, and i n t h e l a b o r f o r c e . Much o f t h e t h e o r y used i n t h i s s e c t i o n was developed p r e v i o u s l y i n t h e minimum wage l i t e r a t u r e b y
Welch (1974) . G r a m l i c h (19761, and M i n c e r (1976 Barro (1977) and Pencavel and Hartsog (1984) has called into question its validity. An employment rule that allows firms to set employment after the wage is given has been shown to leave mutually beneficial trades unexploited and involve a solution that leaves workers and firms off the contract curve. An optimal employment rule would involve the joint determination of employment and wages by labor and management. Under such a rule, movements in union wages need not be associated with movements along the labor demand curve and resultant reductions in employment. However, since observed union contracts leave the employment deci s ion to management, we assume that employment i s determined unilaterally without attempting to explain why contracts take this form.
With a f i x e d 'labor f o r c e , o r i n e l a s t i c a l l y s u p p l i e d l a b o r , t h i s r e d u c t i o n i n employment t r a n s l a t e s i n t o an equal i n c r e a s e i n t h e l e v e l o f i n v o l u n t a r y unemployment. I n t h i s case E , -E,, workers would l i k e t o work, b u t a r e u n a b l e t o g a i n employment a t t h e new u n i o n wage r a t e . Thus, i n the c o n t e x t o f a s i m p l e o n e -s e c t o r model w i t h a f i x e d l a b o r f o r c e , t h e employment and unemployment e f f e c t s o f u n i o n s a r e o f equal magnitude. I f l a b o r i s e l a s t i c a l l y s u p p l i e d however, t h e e f f e c t on measured unemployment o f a n i n c r e a s e i n u n i o n wages i s ambiguous. I n t h i s case, E , -E,,, w o r k e r s want employment, b u t cannot g e t i t a t t h e u n i o n wage (see f i g u r e 1 ) . These workers w i l l show up as unemployed o n l y i f t h e y c o n t i n u e t o engage i n search f o r t h e r a t i o n e d E,, j o b s . As Welch (1974) 
i l i s t i c search b e h a v i o r . Consequently, t h i s s i m p l e model y i e l d s ambiguous p r e d i c t i o n s about t h e e f f e c t o f u n i o n s on t h e measured unemployment, b u t p r e d i c t unambiguously t h a t employment w i l l f a l l .
A fundamental problem w i t h t h i s simple one-sector a n a l y s i s i s t h a t i t does n o t a l l o w f o r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e r e a r e non-union workers i n the economy. Consequently, t h i s s i m p l e model may be u s e f u l i n a n a l y z i n g t h e employment e f f e c t s o f u n i o n s w i t h i n a f i r m , b u t w i l l be o f l i m i t e d v a l u e i n s t u d y i n g t h e i n d u s t r y -w i d e or aggregate consequences. M u l t i -s e c t o r models t h a t a l l o w f o r t h e presence o f a non-union s e c t o r have been d e v e l o p e d by Johnson
and Mieszkowski (1970) and D i e w e r t (1974). These g e n e r a l e q u i l i b r i u m models examine t h e i m p a c t o f u n i o n s on non-union wages i n a w o r l d w i t h v a r y i n g f a c t o r i n t e n s i t i e s . W i t h i n t h e minimum wage l i t e r a t u r e , Welch (1974) . M i n c e r the employment and unemployment effects of legislated wage floors, but they have typically assumed that factor intensities do not vary across sectors.
In a multi-sector model, an increase in wages in the union sector again leads t o a reduction in employment in the unionized sector. as employers move up their labor demand schedules. The higher wage, W,,, creates an excess supply o f workers who are now willing to work in the non-union sector if the non-union wage is also W.,. The addition of these workers to the non-union sector shifts out the supply cur-ve in that sector.' This increase in the supply of labor in the non-union sector will alter either wages or employment in the non-union sector, and most likely both."' 9 . Gramlich (1976) has noted that if union jobs g o to workers with the lowest reservation wage, then the supply curve for workers in the non-union sector would shift out only in that region above the reservation wages of the displaced workers. If jobs are assigned randomly then a parallel shift in the labor supply curve will occur.
10. Mincer's (1976) analysis implies that the existence o f a union premium may cause some worker-s to prefer being unemployed, but in the queue for union jobs to being employed in the non-union sector.
Consequently, a union wage premium may cause labor to flow from the non-union t o union sector. He has shown that a net flow of labor from the union to non-union sector occurs if the elasticity of demand for labor exceeds the turnover rate in the union sector. As noted by Holzer (1982) . given the low turnover rates in the unionized-sector, this condition will in general be met.
The e f f e c t a n t o t a l employment, D , , depends upon t h e impact o f u n i o n s on average wages i n t h e economy.
a where w = t h e p e r c e n t a g e change i n average wages. The change i n average wages i s a w e i g h t e d average o f t h e p e r c e n t a g e change i n wages i n t h e u n i o n and non-union s e c t o r s .
where k = p e r c e n t o f employment t h a t i s u n i o n i z e d h , = percentage change i n wages i n s e c t o r i .
From ( 2 ) we can see t h a t t h e e f f e c t on aggregate employment o f an i n c r e a s e i n u n i o n wages ( o r i n t h e p e r c e n t o f t h e w o r k f o r c e t h a t i s o r g a n i z e d ) w i l l depend on t h e i m p a c t o f such a change on non-union wages. Average wages, and hence employment, w i l l change as l o n g as:
Welch ( 1 9 7 4 ) has shown t h a t i n a t w o -s e c t o r model w i t h c o n s t a n t i n t e n s i t i e s , t h e changes i n non-union wages w i l l b e a f u n c t i o n o f t h e e l a s t i c i t y o f l a b o r s u p p l y , E t h e p e r c e n t u n i o n i z e d , k , and t h e change i n union wages, W,, . " Thus we have:
From ( 4 ) we see t h a t u n l e s s t h e e l a s t i c i t y o f l a b o r s~n o l y i s z e r o ( E = 0 ) . non-union wages w i l l n o t f a l l enough t o p r e v e n t average wages f r o m r i s i n g and t o t a l employment f r o m f a l l i n g . F a l l i n g wages i n t h e non-union
s e c t o r cause workers w i t h h i g h r e s e r v a t i o n wages t o withdraw f r o m t h e l a b o r f o r c e , t h u s c a u s i n g t o t a l employment t o d e c l i n e . " U s i n g ( 2 ) and ( 4 ) we can express t h e e l a s t i c i t y o f t o t a l employment w i t h r e s p e c t t o u n i o n wage changes
as :
The h i g h e r t h e e l a s t i c i t y o f s u p p l y , c . o r t h e g r e a t e r the p e r c e n t o r g a n i z e d , k , t h e g r e a t e r t h e disemployment e f f e c t a s s o c i a t e d w i t h an i n c r e a s e i n u n i o n wages. However, i f l a b o r s u p p l y i s i n e l a s t i c , t o t a l employment w i l l remain f i x e d . "
e q u a t i o n 6 ) . The change i n non-union wages i s n o t a f u n c t i o n o f t h e e l a s t i c i t y o f l a b o r demand i n t h i s model because of h i s assumption t h a t t h e e l a s t i c i t y i s c o n s t a n t a c r o s s s e c t o r s . Thus, w h i l e a h i g h e l a s t i c i t y o f demand leads to a b i g g e r
disemployment e f f e c t i n t h e u n i o n s e c t o r , i t a l s o means t h a t more w o r k e r s w i l l g a i n non-union employment as wages f a l l .
I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a u n i o n wage premium may a c t u a l l y draw more workers i n t o t h e l a b o r f o r c e t h a n cause them t o e x i t because o f t h e depressed non-union wage r a t e . T h i s w i l l o c c u r , however o n l y i f t h e t u r n o v e r r a t e exceeds t h e e l a s t i c i t y o f demand f o r l a b o r . As n o t e d e a r l i e r , t h i s c o n d i t i o n i s u n l i k e l y t o h o l d i n I n a g e n e r a l e q u i l i b r i u m model w i t h v a r i a b l e f a c t o r i n t e n s i t i e s . t h e e f f e c t o f u n i o n s on wages i n the non-union s e c t o r and hence on t o t a l employment. i s ambiguous. If t h e u n i o n i z e d s e c t o r i s t h e l a b o r -i n t e n s i v e s e c t o r t h e n , as shown i n Johnson and Mieszkowski (1970), b o t h t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n and t h e s c a l e
e f f e c t w i l l r e s u l t i n a reduced c a p i t a l / l a b o r r a t i o i n t h e non-union s e c t o r , and hence a r e d u c t i o n i n t h e m a r g i n a l p r o d u c t o f l a b o r and wages. However, w i t h a c a p i t a l -i n t e n s i v e u n i o n i z e d s e c t o r . non-union workers w i l l g e t h i g h e r wages i f t h e s c a l e e f f e c t i s g r e a t e r than t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n e f f e c t and l o w e r wages i f t h e converse i s t r u e . I n e i t h e r case. i n c r e a s e s i n u n i o n wages o r i n t h e p e r c e n t o f t h e l a b o r f o r c e t h a t i s u n i o n i z e d w i l l t e n d t o be a s s o c i a t e d ! w i t h an i n c r e a s e i n average wages and a f a l l i n t o t a l employment, as 1ong;as
J l a b o r s u p p l y i s n o t c o m p l e t e l y i n e l a s t i c .
Work by M i n c e r (1976) has suggested t h a t a g r o w i n g u n i o n wage d i f f e r e n t i a l may a l s o g e n e r a t e "permanent" o r " e q u i l i b r i u m unemployment." because dages w i l l n o t f a l l t o t h e l e v e l t o e q u i l i b r a t e t h e s u p p l y and demand f o r l a b o r i n the non-union s e c t o r . Wages w i l l remain above t h i s e q u i l i b r i u m l e v e l because some workers who do n o t have u n i o n s e c t o r j o b s may p r e f e r t o remain unemployed u n t i l one o f these j o b s opens up. The e x i s t e n c e o f w o r k e r s who p r e f e r t o search r a t h e r t h a n a c c e p t employment i n t h e non-union s e c t o r l e a d s t o voluntary, or search, unemployment similar to the official definition I / of unemployment.
In the long run, the movement of workers across sectors will lead to an equilibration of the expected utility of the wages in the two sectors. That is, the expected utility of a relatively more certain non-union job will equal the expected utility of a more uncertain but higher-paying union job; for risk-neutral workers, the e.<pected value o f wages in the two sectors wi 1 1 be equal. ' " Thus, we have where P is the probability of being employed in the union sector, and W,, and
. , W,, are wages in the union and non-union sector, respectively."
13. It should be noted that this model makes the strong assumption that workers can not engage in search while employed in the non-union sector. The Grarnlich-Mincer model can be modified, however, to incorporate search while employed without any changes in the qualitative nature o f its predictions. See Brown, Gilroy and Kohen (1982) for a discussion of this issue.
14. Gramlich (1976) allows for the existence of transfers like unemployment insurance. This raises the expected value of unionsector compensation, but does not alter the qualitative nature of our results.
15. Following Mincer (19761, we are assuming that the probability of getting employment in the non-union sector is 1. the v o l u n t a r y unemployment r a t e can be expressed as a f u n c t i o n o f t h e unfon # wage e f f e c t , t h e p e r c e n t o r g a n i z e d , and t h e t u r n o v e r r a t e : From ( 9 ) we can see t h a t increases i n the p e r c e n t o r g a n i z e d o r t h e u n i o n wage premium w i l l l e a d t o an i n c r e a s e i n unemployment r e l a t i v e t o employment. ' "
16. This assumes t h a t c h a n g e s . i n u n i o n coverage have no e f f e c t on t h e unionlnon-union wage d i f f e r e n t i a l . Although t h e r e i s c u r r e n t l y debate o v e r whether changes i n coverage may increase t h e u n i o n wage o f premium, t h e r e i s no evidence t o suggest t h a t i t decreases i t .
Thus. t h e q u a l i t a t i v e n a t u r e o f ' t h e s e p r e d i c t i o n s i s u n l i k e l y t o be a l t e r e d b y r e l a x i n g t h i s assumption. This displacement of workers from the unionized sector leads to an increase in the supply of non-union workers. a rise in unemp1oyment. or both. Unemployment rises because some workers opt to search for a union job rather than accept ! employment at a non-union job for a lower wage. Unless the elasticity i 1 of labor supply in the non-union sector is zero. the increas'ed supply of workers to the non-union sector will also result in some labor force withdrawals." Increases in the extent of coverage has a similar effect on employment and unemployment because it involves an increase in the effective cost of labor in the union sector.
IV. Empirical Results
To test for the employment and unemployment effects of unions, we used data from the 1983 Current Population Survey (CPS) Earnings File and Census data on SMSA characteristics. This data set was chosen. in part, because it contains detailed personal characteristics for each respondent that allow us 17. Labor flows in this direction as long as the turnbver rate is lower than the elasticity of demand for labor in the union sector. Given the low turnover rates in unionized jobs, we might expect that in general this condition will hold. 
8
To examine t h e disemployment e f f e c t o f u n i o n s , we i n i t i a l l y looked a t t h e we can examine whether u n i o n i s m has d i f f e r e n t e f f e c t s on t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f g a i n i n g p a r t -t i m e versus f u l l -t i m e employment. These e f f e c t s may d i f f e r s u b s t a n t i a l l y i f u n i o n i s m a f f e c t s t h e l e n g t h o f t h e workweek f o r those who remain employed.
18
. B e g i n n i n g i n 1981, t h e CPS reduced t h e number o f s u r v e y e d i n d i v i d u a l s and asked d e t a i l e d employment q u e s t i o n s o f o n l y o n e -q u a r t e r of t h e sample each month. As a r e s u l t , t h e number o f u n i o n members i n many of t h e SMSAs i n any g i v e n month i s too s m a l l t o a l l o w us t o have s u f f i c i e n t degrees of freedom f o r e s t i m a t i o n .
As shown i n s e c t i o n 11, t h e e f f e c t o f u n i o n i s m on employment and unemployment i s a f u n c t i o n o f b o t h t h e p e r c e n t o r g a n i z e d and t h e u n i o n wage premium. C o n s e q u e n t l y , as s u g g e s t e d b y e q u a t i o n s ( 5 ) and ( 9 > , t h e measure o f t h e e f f e c t o f u n i o n i s m t h a t we used i s t h e p r o d u c t o f t h e p e r c e n t o f employment i n an SMSA t h a t i s u n i o n i z e d and t h e u n i o n / n o n -u n i o n wage d i f f e r e n t i a l . ' . ' T h i s i n d e x i s s i m i l a r t o t h e K a i t z i n d e x , w i d e l y used i n t h e minimum wage l i t e r a t u r e f o r e x a m i n i n g p o t e n t i a l disemployment e f f e c t s o f a l e g i s l a t e d wage i n c r e a s e above c o m p e t i : i \~e l e v e l s . "
P r e v i o u s c r o s s -s e c t i o n work by H o l z e r ( 1 9 8 2 ) . Kahn and Morimune ( 1 9 7 9 ) . and Kahn ( 1 9 7 8 ) has i m p l i c i t l y c o n s t r a i n e d t h e e f f e c t o f u n i o n s o n employment t o o p e r a t e s o l e l y t h r o u g h d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e p e r c e n t o r g a n i z e d acr-oss SMSAs. ! , T h i s c o n s t r a i n t i s a n a l o g o u s t o r e q u i r i n g t h a t t h e u n i o n r e l a t i v e wage e f f e c t be t h e same a c r o s s SMSAs, w h i c h m i g h t be i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t h e o r e t i c a l and
e c o n o m e t r i c r e a s o n s . 1 9 . We r e s t r i c t o u r sample t o t h e nonfarm economy when we a r e c a l c u l a t i n g b o t h t h e u n i o n wage premium and t h e p e r c e n t o f employed t h a t a r e u n i o n members. The sample was r e s t r i c t e d t o c i v i l i a n s age 16-65 w o r k i n g f o r wages and s a l a r y . 2 0 . I n minimum wage s t u d i e s , E h r e n b e r g ( 1 9 8 0 ) and Welch ( 1 9 7 8 ) have 
s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h i s t y p e of i n d e x i m p l i c i t l y c o n s t r a i n s t h e p e r c e n t c o v e r e d and wage premium t o have symmetric e f f e c t s o n employment o r unemployment. They have s u g g e s t e d s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e measures t h a t a l l o w for d i f f e r e n t e f f e c t s f r o m t h e p e r c e n t c o v e r e d and t h e wage premium. As a check o n t h e s e n s i t i v i t y o f o u r r e s u l t s t o t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n , we e s t i m a t e d o u r employment e q u a t i o n s w i t h i n d e x e s t h a t r i s e more t h a n p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y w i t h changes i n t h e p e r c e n t u n i o n i z e d or w i t h t h e u n i o n wage premium. The q u a l i t a t i v e n a t u r e of o u r r e s u l t s were n o t s e n s i t i v e t o t h e u s e o f t h e s e o t h e r i n d e x e s .
Recent t h e o r e t i c a l work by Lazear (1983) suggests t h a t t h e p e r c e n t u n i o n i z e d i n an i n d u s t r y o r r e g i o n i s n o t a good measure o f u n i o n power. He shows t h a t t o t h e degree the c o s t o f r u n n i n g a u n i o n d i f f e r s a c r o s s i n d u s t r i e s , d i f f e r e n t wagelemployment packages w i l l be n e g o t i a t e d b y unions f a c i n g thel same o p p o r t u n i t y l o c u s o r h a v i n g t h e same s t r e n g t h . That i s , u n i o n s i n i n d u s t r i e s where c o s t s a r e h i g h w i l l t e n d t o p r e f e r h i g h e rwagellower-employment share packages t h a n w i l l u n i o n s i n r e l a t i v e l y l o w -c o s t m a r k e t s . Consequently, the per-cent o f employment t h a t i s u n i o n i z e d o r t h e u n i o n wage premium w i l l v a r y a c r o s s i n d u s t r i e s o r r e g i o n s , even though u n i o n power i s t h e same. G r e a t e r u n i o n s t r e n g t h w i l l be i n d i c a t e d b y a b e t t e r wagelemployment share package and n o t j u s t a h i g h e r p e r c e n t u n i o n i z e d . ! b C o n s e q u e n t l y . i t i s necessary t o c o n t r o l f o r b o t h t h e wage premium and t h e ! p e r c e n t u n i o n i z e d i n o r d e r t o g e t a measure o f u n i o n s t r e n g t h a c r o s s m a r k e t s .
To t h e degree t h e u n i o n r e l a t i v e wage e f f e c t d i f f e r s a c r o s s SMSAs, f a i l u r e t o c o n t r o l f o r d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e wage premium w i l l y i e l d i n e f f i c i e n t and p o t e n t i a l l y b i a s e d e s t i m a t e s . S i n c e t h e u n i o n wage premium may be d e t e r m i n e d b y many o f t h e same exogenous v a r i a b l e s t h a t determine employment, t h i s term i s l i k e l y t o be c o r r e l a t e d w i t h t h e independent v a r i a b l e s i n t h e model. The r e s u l t m i g h t be t h a t the e s t i m a t e d c o e f f i c i e n t s i n p r e v i o u s s t u d i e s a r e b i a s e d .
To c o n s t r u c t o u r measure o f u n i o n s t r e n g t h , i t was f i r s t n e c e s s a r y t o d e r i v e an e s t i m a t e o f t h e u n i o n l n o n -u n i o n wage d i f f e r e n t i a l i n each SMSA. To do t h i s , we e s t i m a t e d s e p a r a t e wage e q u a t i o n s f o r u n i o n and non-union members
t o r o f i n d i v i d u a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t determine wages; and e , i s an e r r o r
term. I n e s t i m a t i n q these wage e q u a t i o n s , we i n c l u d e d c o n t r o l s for-s c h o . 3 l i n g . e x p e r i e n c e , experience squared, o c c u p a t i~n , i n d u s t r y , r-ace, gender-, f u l l -t i m e , v e t e r a n s , and m a r i t a l s t a t u s . ' From ( 1 1 ) the u n i o n l n o n -u n i o n wage d i f f e r e n t i a l f o r each SMSA, z , , wa.s c a l c u l a t e d as:
where B r e p r e s e n t s t h e e s t i m a t e d c o e f f i c i e n t s from t h e u n i o n o r non-union wage r e g r e s s i o n , a n d X i s the mean v a l u e o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n each
SMSA.
T h i s procedure t r e a t s u n i o n s t a t u s as exogenous when e s t i m a t i n g t h e u n i o n wage premium. Work by Heckman (1978) and Duncan and L e i g h (1985) and o t h e r s suggests t h a t t h i s may y i e l d b i a s e d e s t i m a t e s o f t h e " t r u e " u n i o n wage e f f e c t , because i t i g n o r e s the s e l e c t i v i t y problem a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e j o i n t d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f union membership and the u n i o n wage premium. Work by Freeman
Since t h e respondents were asked o n l y asked t h e i r u n i o n s t a t u s , and t h e e a r n i n g s q u e s t i o n s i n t h e l a s t month of t h e i r r o t a t i o n i n t h e CPS sample, we a l s o i n c l u d e d m o n t h l y dummies t o c o n t r o l . f o r seasonal
v a r i a t i o n s .
and Medoff (1981.) and Freeman (1984) 
however, suggests t h a t c u r r e n t econometric techniques f o r a d d r e s s i n g t h i s problem s u f f e r f r o m extreme s e n s i t i v i t y t o changes i n sample p e r i o d o r model s p e c i f i c a t i o n . Consequently, they have argued a g a i n s t u s i n g such c o r r e c t i o n s as the i n v e r s e o f t h e M i l l s r a t i o i n e s t i m a t i n g t h i s d i
f f e r e n t i a l , and i n s t e a d , advocate u s i n g o r d i n a r y l e a s t squares (OLS) e s t i m a t e s , which do n o t appear t o s u f f e r from these problems. Because we a r e o n l y i n t e r e s t e
d i n t h e e f f e c t o f v a r i a t i o n s i n t h e s i z e o f t h i s premium on employment and n o t i n i t s l e v e l per se, we have chosen t o use the e s t i m a t e s f r o m these OLS r e g r e s s i o n s . A l t h o u g h s e l e c t i v i t y b i a s may mean t h a t t h e e s t i m a t e d wage d i f f e r e n t i a l s a r e b i a s e d upwards, i t i s n o t c l e a r why t h e s e l e c t i v i t y b i a s should v a r y across SMSAs i n a way t h a t i s c o r r e l a t e d w i t h the e r r o r term i n o u r employment e q u a t i o n . I n t h e absence o f
C t h i s k i n d o f c o r r e l a t i o n , t h e employment e q u a t i o n s should s t i 11 y i e l d u n M a s e d e s t i m a t e s o f t h e e f f e c t of u n i o n s t r e n g t h on employment and unemployment. I n examining p o t e n t i a l disemployment e f f e c t s of unions, we attempted t o c o n t r o l f o r o t h e r f a c t o r s besides unionism t h a t may s h i f t e i t h e r t h e s u p p l y o r demand f o r l a b o r and hence a f f e c t t h e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l w i l l be employed. I n c l u d e d i n t h e model i s a v e c t o r o f i n d i v i d u a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t may a f f e c t e i t h e r t h e s u p p l y o r demand f o r l a b o r as w e l l as SMSA s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t r e f l e c t l o c a l l a b o r market c o n d i t i o n s . I n p a r t i c u l a r , we c o n t r o l f o r d i f f e r e n c e s i n s c h o o l i n g . p o t e n t i a l l a b o r market e x p e r i e n c e , r a c e , gender, m a r i t a l s t a t u s , geographic r e g i o n , s i z e o f SMSA, l o c a l unemployment r a t e , and t h e p e r c e n t o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n i n an SMSA t h a t r e c e i v e s A i d t o Fami 1 i e s w i t h Dependent Chi l d r e n (AFDC) . '' 2 2 . We a l s o i n c l u d e d m o n t h l y dummies t o c o n t r o l f o r seasonal v a r i a t i o n s i n employment.
The resulting employment equation i s :
where E , , is an index that indicates the employment status o f the ith individual in the kth SMSA. Z , , is a vector of personal and SMSA-specific characteristics that affect that probability of being employed, and UN, is the measure of union strength.
The r-esults of estimating these linear probability employment equations for the employed workers and for part-time and full-time employed workers albeit insignificant, effect on the likelihood of being employed. A s seen in regression (I), increases in union strength have a negative and significant impact on the probability of being employed. Thus, the fraction of the 23. There are several well-known problems with the linear probability model, having to do with heteroscadasticity and prediction that lie outside the 0-1 interval. Because o f the cost o f estimating logit equations with a data set this large, however, we have not attempted to estimate this model using maximum likelihood techniques.
Nonetheless, the estimates from the linear probability model should be consistent.
p o p u l a t i o n employed i n an SMSA w i l l be i n v e r s e l y r e l a t e d t o the e x t e n t o f u n i o n i s m and t h e u n i o n wage premium. The magnitude o f t h i s e f f e c t can be c a p t u r e d by c a l c u l a t i n g t h e change i n t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f b e i n g employed f o r a base case o r average w o r k e r . when t h e v a l u e o f t h e u n i o n s t r e n g t h v a r i a b l e changes by one s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n f r o m i t s mean value:" The expected p r o b a b i l i t y o f b e i n g employed was f o u n d t o d e c l i n e from 0.829 t o 0.825 w i t h t h i s i n c r e a s e i n u n i o n s t r e n g t h . A l t e r n a t i v e l y . t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f b e i n g employed f o r o u r average worker i n t h e SMSA where u n i o n s t r e n g t h i s h i g h e s t (San B e r n a r d i n o , CA.) i s o n l y about 2 p e r c e n t l e s s than i f t h a t worker l i v e d i n t h e SMSA where u n i o n s t r e n g t h i s t h e l e a s t ( A t l a n t a , G A . ) . " Thus, i t would appear t h a t changes i n t h e e x t e n t o f u n i o n s t r e n g t h have o n l y a v e r y l i m i t e d impact on a g g r e g a t e employment. Changes i n s c h o o l i n g , e x p e r i e n c e , qr
m a r k e t c o n d i t i o n s have a much g r e a t e r impact on t h e l i k e l i h o o d B f
b e i n g employed t h a n u n i o n i s m . For i n s t a n c e , a s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n i n c r e a s e i n t h e number o f y e a r s o f s c h o o l i n g i n c r e a s e s t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f b e i n g employed f o r t h e base case worker about 10.6 p e r c e n t , w h i l e a s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n i n c r e a s e i n t h e number o f y e a r s o f p o t e n t i a l l a b o r market 24. The base case worker i s a s i n g l e w h i t e male w i t h 12.6 year-s o f s c h o o l i n g , 18.5 y e a r s o f e x p e r i e n c e who l i v e s i n the E a s t -N o r t h -C e n t r a l r e g i o n o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n an SMSA w i t h an unemployment r a t e o f 9 . 4 p e r c e n t i n March. a p o p u l a t i o n o f 3,479,000, where 5.5 p e r c e n t of t h e p o p u l a t i o n r e c e i v e s AFDC, and t h e u n i o n s t r e n g t h v a r i a b l e equals 0.031 25. The u n i o n s t r e n g t h v a r i a b l e ranges f r o m 0.0795 t o -0.0015. I n San B e r n a r d i n o , t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f b e i n g employed i s 0.818 w h i l e i t i s e x p e r i e n c e i n c r e a s e s i t by 3 6 . 6 percent: ' From r e g r e s s i o n s ( 2 ) and ( 3 ) . we see t h a t u n i o n i s m w i l l a f f e c t t h e l e n g t h o f t h e workweek f o r t h o s e who r e m a i n employed. I f u n i o n i s m has n o e f f e c t o n h o u r s worked, t h e n t h e e f f e c t on t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f w o r k i n g f u l l -t i m e s h o u l d be t h e same as i t i s on t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f w o r k i n g p a r t -t i m e .
C o n v e r s e l y , i f employers r e d u c e t h e hours worked of those t h a t t h e y keep employed, t h e n o u r u n i o n v a r i a b l e s h o u l d be p o s i t i v e i n t h e p a r t -t i m e r e g r e s s i o n and n e g a t i v e i n t h e f u l l -t i m e r e g r e s s i o n . We found t h a t t h i s i s i n d e e d t h e case. The u n i o n v a r i a b l e was n e g a t i v e and s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h e f u l l -t i m e employment e q u a t i o n , w h i l e i t was p o s i t i v e b u t i n s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h e ! L p a r t -t i m e employment e q u a t i o n . U s i n g these e s t i m a t e d c o e f f i c i e n t s , we can see r t h a t a s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n i n c r e a s e i n u n i o n s t r e n g t h l e a d s t o a 0 . 7 p e r c e n t r e d u c t i o n i n t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f b e i n g employed f u l l -t i m e and a 1 . 0 p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e i n t h e p r o b a b i 1 i t y o f b e i n g employed p a r t -t i m e . " I n a d d i t i o n , b o t h t h e p o i n t e s t i m a t e and t h e degree of s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e u n i o n s t r e n g t h v a r i a b l e a r e much h i g h e r i n t h e f u l l -t i m e e q u a t i o n t h a n i n t h e t o t a l employment e q u a t i o n . These r e s u l t s suggest t h a t p a r t of t h e disemployment e f f e c t o f u n i o n s comes t h r o u g h r e d u c i n g t h e number o f h o u r s worked o n t h a t job.
26. The s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n f o r s c h o o l i n g i s 2 . 9 y e a r s and 14.4 y e a r s f o r e x p e r i e n c e .
27. The p r o b a b i l i t y of b e i n g employed f u l l -t i m e and p a r t -t i m e for o u r base case w o r k e r s i s 0.677 and 0.152, r e s p e c t i v e l y .
As a f u r t h e r . t e s t o f t h i s h y p o t h e s i s , we r e e s t i m a t e d t h e employment e q u a t i o n w i t h t h e dependent v a r i a b l e as t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of w o r k i n g p a r t -t i m e g i v e n t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l was employed. Unions may reduce t h e workweek b y
i n c r e a s i n g t h e r e l a t i v e frequency o f p a r t -t i m e j o b s r e l a t i v e t o f u l l -t i m e j o b s . As seen i n r e g r e s s i o n ( 4 ) i n t a b l e 1 , i n c r e a s e s i n u n i o n s t r e n g t h i n c r e a s e t h e f r a c t i o n o f employment t h a t i s p a r t -t i m e . A s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n i n c r e a s e i n u n i o n s t r e n g t h i n c r e a s e s t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f w o r k i n g p a r t -t i m e f o r t h e base case worker b y about 3 p e r c e n t . ' " Given these e s t i m a t e s , the average worker i s about 19 p e r c e n t l e s s l i k e l y t o be w o r k i n g f u l l -t i m e i n t h e h i g h e s t u n i o n s t r e n g t h SMSA t h a n he i s i n the l o w e s t u n i o n s t r e n g t h SMSA.
Thus. these e s t i m a t e s suggest t h a t i n c r e a s e s i n u n i o n wages o r t h e p e r c e n t I o r g a n i z e d m i g h t have a b i g g e r e f f e c t on hours worked p e r week o r t h e mix 06 r f u l l -t i m e and p a r t -t i m e j o b s t h a n on t h e l e v e l o f t o t a l employment.
I n s e c t i o n 111. i t was shown t h a t t h e disemployment e f f e c t o f u n i o n s was a f u n c t i o n o f t h e e l a s t i c i t y o f l a b o r s u p p l y . The g r e a t e r t h e e l a s t i c i t y o f s u p p l y , t h e g r e a t e r t h e disemployment e f f e c t . Given t h i s , we m i g h t e x p e c t t h a t t h e disemployment e f f e c t would be l a r g e s t f o r groups w i t h a weak l a b o r f o r c e 28. The p r o b a b i l i t y o f w o r k i n g p a r t -t i m e f o r t h e base case worker i s 0.1429. The base case worker i n t h i s sample i s a g a i n a s i n g l e w h i t e male w i t h 13.2 y e a r s o f s c h o o l i n g , 17.8 years o f e x p e r i e n c e who l i v e s i n t h e E a s t -N o r t h -C e n t r a l r e g i o n o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n an SMSA w i t h an unemployment r a t e o f 9.2 p e r c e n t i n March. a p o p u l a t i o n o f a t t a c h m e n t o r a h i g h e l a s t i c i t y o f l a b o r s u p p l y . Teenagers o r young p e o p l e ma; , be more a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d t h a n o l d e r -w o r k e r s , whi l e females may s u f f e r more t h a n m a l e s . To t e s t f o r d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e disemployment e f f e c t a c r o s s groups, we e s t i m a t e d s e p a r a t e employment e q u a t i o n s f o r p a r t -t i m e and f u l l -t i m e workers b y gender and age g r o u p . These r e s u l t s a r e p r e s e n t e d i n t a b l e s 2 and 3 .
The b a s i c p r e d i c t i o n s o f o u r t h e o r y seem t o h o l d . Based o n t h e p o i n t
e s t i m a t e s f r o m t h e s e r e g r e s s i o n s , we see t h a t t h e disemployment e f f e c t o f u n i o n s i s s m a l l e r f o r p r i m e age males t h a n for-teenagers o r 20-24 y e a r o l d males. I n f a c t , p r i m e age males do n o t appear t o be a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d by changes i n u n i o n s t r e n g t h a t a l l . T h i s p r o b a b l y r e f l e c t s t h e i r s t r o n g l a b o r f o r c e a t t a c h m e n t o r low e l a s t i c i t y o f l a b o r s u p p l y . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , t h e t I b e v i d e n c e does n o t s u p p o r t t h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t teenagers a r e more a d v e r s e l y t a f f e c t e d t h a n 20-24 y e a r o l d s . As e x p e c t e d , t h e disemployment e f f e c t o f 1 ,A u n i o n i s m i s g r e a t e r f o r p r i m e age f e m a l e s than f o r p r i m e age males:
I n g e n e r a l , i n c r e a s e s i n t h e u n i o n wage premium o r t h e p e r c e n t o r g a n i z e d a l s o a f f e c t t h e workweek o r t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f b e i n g employed p a r t -t i m e more f o r f e m a l e s t h a n f o r males. Whether t h i s r e f l e c t s a g r e a t e r a t t a c h m e n t t o t h e l a b o r f o r c e i s a q u e s t i o n f o r f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h .
To i n v e s t i g a t e whether t h e disemployment
f o r c e , t h e n t h e c o e f f i c i e n t on t h e u n i o n s t r e n g t h v a r i a b l e i n t h e l a b o r f o r c e r e g r e s s i o n s h o u l d equal t h a t i n t h e employment r e g r e s s i o n . The r e s u l t s from e s t i m a t i n g t h e l a b o r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n e q u a t i o n a r e p r e s e n t e d i n r e g r e s s i o n ( 5 ) i n t a b l e 1 .
The u n i o n c o e f f i c i e n t i s b o t h n e g a t i v e and s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h i s r e g r e s s i o n .
The p o i n t e s t i m a t e on t h i s term i s a b o u t 25 p e r c e n t b i g g e r than i t i s i n t h e employment e q u a t i o n . This suggests t h a t i n c r e a s e s i n u n i o n s t r e n g t h cause b o t h an i n c r e a s e i n t h e number o f unemployed workers and a r e d u c t i o n i n l a b o r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n . When these e q u a t i o n s were e s t i m a t e d f o r d i f f e r e n t gender and age g r o u p s . we found t h a t , i n g e n e r a l . females s u f f e r e d a b i g g e r l a b o r i f o r c e e f f e c t than males. T h i s was p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e when comparing p r i m e t age males and females. '' Based on t h e r e g r e s s i o n s i n t a b l e 1 , however, i t would appear t h a t t h e disemployment e f f e c t o f u n i o n i s m r e s u l t s p r i m a r i l y f r o m a r e d u c t i o n i n t h e s i z e o f t h e l a b o r f o r c e and n o t f r o m an i n c r e a s e i n t h e numbel-o f unemployed. Thus, unemployment r a t e s w i l l tend t o be h i g h e r i n r e g i o n s w i t h a h i g h degree o f u n i o n s t r e n g t h , p r i m a r i l y because o f a r e d u c t i o n i n t h e s i z e o f t h e l a b o r f o r c e , and n o t because o f an i n c r e a s e i n t h e number o f unemployed. I t s h o u l d be n o t e d , however, t h a t the magnitude o f t h e e f f e c t o f changes i n u n i o n s t r e n g t h on t h e l a b o r f o r c e i s q u i t e s m a l l . A s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n i n c r e a s e i n u n i o n s t r e n g t h reduces the l i k e l i h o o d o f b e i n g i n t h e l a b o r f o r c e b y o n l y 0 . 1 p e r c e n t . ' ' Our average o r base case worker i s a b o u t h i g h e s t u n i o n s t r e n g t h SMSA than i f he r e s i d e s i n the lowest u n i o n s t r e n g t h SMSA.
V . C o n c l u s i o n s I n t h i s p a p e r , we p r e s e n t e s t i m a t e s o f the e f f e c t o f changes i n u n i o n s t r e n g t h on t h e l i k e l i employed. These disemployment e f f e c t s from unions were c o n c e n t r a t e d m a i n l y among females and young men. w i t h l i t t l e i f any n e g a t i v e impact on p r i m e age males. These disemployment e f f e c t s , howevel-, were i n general found t o be q u i t e s m a l l . w i t h u n i o n i s m h a v i n g a more pronounced e f f e c t on the m i x o f p a r t -t i m e and f u l l -t i m e employment, and hence the workweek, than on t h e number o f j o b s . A l l o f t h e s e e f f e c t s were dwarfed i n importance by t h e s t a t e o f t h e UN i s t h e p r o d u c t o f t h e p e r c e n t u n i o n i z e d and t h e u n i o n wage premium i n each SMSA. Unemployment Rate i s the l o c a l unemployment r a t e f o r a l l workers i n t h e SMSA.
P o p u l a t i o n i s t h e number o f p e o p l e l i v i n g i n t h e SMSA. 
AFDC i s t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n i n t h e
Sex i s a dummy t h a t equals 1 i s t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s a male.
I n a d d i t i o n to these v a r i a b l e s , each r e g r e s s i o n c o n t a i n s a dummy t e r m t h a t e q u a l s 1 i f t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s m a r r i e d , n i n e r e g i o n a l dummies where t h e o m i t t e d c a t e g o r y i s t h e E a s t -N o r t h -C e n t r a l r e g i o n , and 11 m o n t h l y dummies t o c o n t r o l f o r t h e month t h e i n d i v i d u a l was surveyed. The complete r e g r e s s i o n r e s u l t s a r e a v a i l a b l e f r o m the a u t h o r upon r e q u e s t . 
- (4) - See data appendix for a description of the independent variables. * significant at 0.10 level. * * significant at 0.05 level.
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